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Abstract 
Over the past decade or so the problems caused by the shadow economy have become a major 
concern for policy makers, researchers, as well as the donor community in Armenia. The shadow 
economy has had some negative consequences during the past transition period, but it also has 
played some positive stabilizing role. The paper discusses various factors that have contributed to 
the development of the shadow economy in Armenia. The main causes for the existence of the 
shadow economy are argued to be the tight and unfair tax administration and regulations, and the 
corruption. Many of the shadow activities in Armenia relate to the problem of non-reporting and/or 
underreporting by business entities. International experience and various methods of estimation of 
shadow economies are presented in the paper.  Two of them, namely currency demand approaches 
of Tanzi and Gutman, are adopted and used for the estimation of the shadow economy in Armenia 
for the period of 1994-2004. The findings of the estimation by these two methods suggest that there 
is a significant amount of economic activities that are not captured by the official statistics.  Some 
policy implications and recommendations are presented at the end of the paper.  
 
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Armenian International Policy Research Group. Working Papers describe 
research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the past transition period the Armenian economy has undergone a systematic 
transformation, and new systems of economic, social and political relationships have 
emerged in our society. Individuals and companies have also faced a significant challenge 
of adjusting to a new economic, political, legal and social environment, which in many 
cases required abidance to new strict rules and restrictions imposed by the government. On 
the other hand, during the past decade or so the government itself was transforming and 
creating new institutions necessary for effective management of the public sector and 
creation of favorable conditions for private sector development under the market economy 
conditions.  
During these past years of transition period there has been a growing concern 
among economists and policymakers over the existence of the shadow economy. A few 
would deny in Armenia that today there are a significant number of economic transactions 
and activities that are not captured by the statistical authorities. All these hidden activities 
have contributed to the growth of the shadow economy of Armenia.  
Because of its multifaceted nature there is still no overall agreement on the terms 
and definitions used to describe the problem of shadow economy. Various definitions and 
terms have been used in the international and local literature to describe the phenomenon 
that is widely known as shadow or underground economy. Terms such as underground, 
black, parallel, second, unofficial, unobserved hidden, cash, unreported, unrecorded, 
illegal, informal, irregular, subterranean, submerged have been used in the professional 
literature to refer to the economic activities that were fully or partially not observed by the 
statistical authorities.   
Today, the problems of shadow economy and the measurement of its size and 
scope are a major challenge for Armenia’s further development. Because of the 
peculiarities of the transitional period, the social, political and economic difficulties and 
many external factors the researchers and policymakers in Armenia have had difficulties in 
estimating the actual magnitude of the shadow activities in Armenia. The government itself 
realizes the need to fight the shadow economy and devoted a section about the problem in 
its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2003). The PRSP highlights the problem of shadow 
economy and mentions tighter control over incomes resulting from illegal economic 
activities and limiting of cash transactions as the main directions for the government’s 
strategy aimed at reducing the hidden economic activities1.  The MTEF program for 2005-
2007 approved by the government also highlights the need to fight against hidden 
economic activities to raise the tax revenues to GDP ratio by 0.4% annually2. In various 
public statements, the President has also underscored the widely used practice of 
underreporting of actual turnover and economic transactions by business entities.  
Despite the importance of the problem so far there has been very limited research 
discussing this phenomenon in Armenia. The National Statistical Service makes some 
estimates of the size of the shadow economy, which, however, are not done in a 
comprehensive and periodic manner. The most recent figure about the official estimate of 
 
1 Armenia-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Chapter 6.3.2, para 196, Yerevan, 2003. 
2 Medium Term Expenditure Framework, p. 27, Yerevan, Armenia. 
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the size of the underground economy of Armenia was published in 1999, according to 
which the size of the unrecorded sector of the Armenian economy in 1999 was at a level of 
28.9% of the official GDP3. This number was estimated based on the findings of a survey 
of 9,000 individuals. However, the year 1999 was the last year when such a survey about 
the underground economy was conducted and for later years the official statistics used 
about 30% estimate in calculation of the official GDP.  While this method captures some 
part of the informal sector, however it is not capturing the whole size of the shadow 
economy. More thorough and regular study of the problem and its development trends is 
critical in better understanding the ongoing economic processes and making relevant 
adjustments and corrections in the policy measures.  
 
Shadow Economy of Armenia: Causes and Consequences 
 
We will start with understanding the definition of shadow or underground 
economy. A simple definition of the shadow economy is that it is the part of the gross 
national product that, because of non-reporting and/or underreported is not included in the 
official statistics4. It can also be defined as a part of the total GDP (official and unofficial) 
that has been left outside the official statistics because of other reasons, not necessary only 
for tax evasion. The latter includes the production of and trade in illegal products and 
services, unrecorded economic transactions that are due to the underdeveloped system of 
national statistics, as well as barter transactions and economic activities carried out by n 
households.  So, in general the shadow activities can be divided into four main categories: 
(i) underreported or not-reported; (ii) illegal; (iii) unrecorded; and (iv) household activities 
and barter transactions. In the following sections we will discuss these types of shadow 
activities in the Armenia.  
 The major part of the shadow economy is assumed to involve those activities that 
were not recorded by the statistical services because of non-reporting or under reporting by 
business entities and citizens, and the main indicator of this hidden part is the difference of 
the total tax revenues estimated on the real level of all economic activities (not the planned 
budget figures) and actually collected tax revenues by the state tax service. This part of the 
shadow economy is of particular interest because of the significant policy implications it 
can have.  
Although the international experience and the academic literature suggest that the 
main reason for the existence of the shadow economy are high rates of taxes and other 
mandatory payments imposed by the government, however, in Armenia these have not 
been the only major factor contributing to the existence of shadow economy. On the 
contrary, the tax regime in Armenia is considered as lenient with relatively low tax rates. 
Widespread corruption and ineffective systems of accountability in the public sector have 
had largely contributed to the expansion of hidden economic activities in Armenia during 
the past decade. Corruption in the public sector has been one of the major factors that 
contributed to the growth of the shadow sector of the economy in Armenia. More 
corruption provides both incentives and reasons for the businesses to go underground. By 
 
3 National  Statistical Service of Armenia, 1999. 
4 First provided by Tanzi (1980) 
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paying the tax inspectors or other government agencies the regular “tax-bribes” the 
businesses consider themselves protected for the coming periods and get incentives to hide 
even more in order to justify the payments made. On the other hand, during the past ten 
years many of the government institutions were just being formed and there was no 
professional civil service or other special public services on place. All these provided 
favorable and not risky environment and conditions for public officials to look for corrupt 
practices that in many cases involved taking bribes or abusing the public offices for private 
gain. One of the few studies on shadow sector of the transition economies also suggests 
that one of the main reasons for the companies to go underground is to avoid the burden of 
administrative regulations and taxations; institutional aspects and regulatory discretion 
play a greater role in expansion of the shadow economy5. 
 For economic entities the bribes paid to the tax or other state officials have been 
preferable to the official taxes to be paid to the state agencies because of several reasons. 
First, and foremost, the bribe paid to the tax officials are usually lower that the real tax 
amounts that should be paid to the tax authorities. Second, non-payment of taxes saves 
some time for the business entities, because it limits the required paperwork and visits to 
various state agencies. The tax regulations and bureaucracy in the Armenian state 
apparatus are so much complicated that some economic agents prefer going underground 
not only for evading taxes, but mostly for avoiding to enter the official state registry so that 
to save their time and energy. Being a fair taxpayer is not rewarded in the current system, 
because of regular harassments that these taxpayers would experience even more. Third, 
payment of taxes in their full amounts puts the entities in a competitive disadvantage since 
their underreporting competitors pay less. Forth, usually regular payments of bribes to tax 
inspectors establishes special personal relationships between them, and over some period 
of time and with the expansion of a particular business the underreported amount increases 
even more.  
Of course being in an underground is supposed to limit the businesses’ access to 
and rights for some benefits, such as bank credits and public goods, in the form of rule of 
law, and other benefits. However, in the Armenian reality these benefits have not material, 
because of the underdeveloped and ineffective systems of provision of such public goods, 
as well as the relationship based crediting widely practiced by commercial banks. The 
other major factor that has contributed to the existence of the shadow sector in Armenia is 
the widespread politicization of many businesses. Today, many public officials have stakes 
in or effectively own various businesses, and by using their role and position in the public 
sector they create favorable conditions for those economic entities. There is also the 
reverse trend of getting public offices using the economic wealth accumulated by engaging 
mostly in shadow activities.  
The second group of shadow economy involves illegal activities. It should be 
realized that taxes and mandatory payments are not the major reason for existence of some 
types of shadow activities. Even if there were no any taxes or regulations there would still 
be some part of economic activities, mostly illegal ones, which would have not been 
captured by the official statistics. Some of the economic agents and citizens are involved in 
production or trade of such products and services that are prohibited by laws and various 
 
5 Kaufman, D. and Kaiberda, A. (1996). 
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regulations, such as drugs, prostitution, trafficking and others.  So, regardless of the tax 
regime and rates these illegal activities will not be reported and thus will be left out of the 
official statistics. It is important, however, to make a distinction among those illegal 
activities that have nothing to do with creation of economic values through production or 
trade. 
There are some economic activities that are not being captured because of the 
underdeveloped systems of national statistics, as well as low and ineffective information 
sharing between various state bodies, such as national statistical service, tax, customs, state 
pension fund and others. Better coordination and information sharing would limit the 
chances of leaving some economic transactions from national accounts. While this problem 
was very serious in the early stages of transition, however, today the national statistical 
service is quite developed and these unrecorded economic activities does not constitute a 
major part in the total shadow economy of Armenia. 
The forth group of the shadow economy includes those activities that are carried 
out using household activities and barter transactions. Some parts of the total economic 
activities are not included in the official statistics because of difficulties of their 
measurement and/or ineffective and underdeveloped mechanisms and tools used by the 
statistical service for collection of relevant information from all sectors of the economy. 
Although the concept of the gross national income suggests that the national accounts 
should involve all economic activities of the society, however the most of the values 
created by households are not measured and accounted in the national statistics.  Although 
these activities that are sometimes also illegal (like production and sale of homemade 
products, readjustments and reconstruction of apartments using relatives’ and neighbors’ 
labor and without any approval from relevant regulatory bodies and others), however they 
create economic values by using scarce economic resources taken from the official part of 
the economy. The main reason for not recording these types of activities in the official 
statistics relates to the measurement problem, as well as the fact that this issue has not been 
a major development problem for the Armenian authorities mostly because of the limited 
policy implications that it has and the existence of other more important areas for the 
government to focus on. The problematic aspect of this issue is the tendency of various 
households to grow and carry out such regular economic activities already on a paid basis. 
In this case, these activities that we categorized as unrecorded become non-reported hidden 
economic activities that are subject to full taxation. Some of the economic activities are 
also left out of official statistics because of underdeveloped systems of national statistical 
data collection.  
Barter transactions are also left unrecorded in any official agency and statistics. 
This type of activities especially involving various agricultural products have been very 
popular particularly in the regions of Armenia. However, as it was with the unrecorded 
economic activities, barter transactions are very difficult to measure and they do not 
constitute a major policy issue to be much concerned with at this stage of Armenia’s 
development. 
High level of dollarization of the Armenian economy and population’s low level of 
trust in the national currency and in the banking sector in general has created a favorable 
situation in which the businesses and population prefer to use US dollars, instead of drams 
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for making payments in large transactions. For official reporting the parties usually use 
smaller contract amounts, which allows them to limit their tax liabilities by underreporting 
the real value of the contract and in the official accounting. The state authorities are not 
able to capture this type of economic transactions because it is impossible to measure the 
amount of informally agreed contracts’ values denominated in US dollars. 
 
Why does the Shadow Economy matter? 
 
There are several reasons why the existence of the shadow economy matters. First 
and foremost, economic policy measures can be misdirected and be of the wrong 
magnitude because of the measurement errors in economic indicators such as GDP, labor 
force, and national income caused by the hidden economy. In addition the underground 
economy can also result in overestimation of unemployment and inflation. As we already 
discussed above it is generally accepted that the shadow economy is mainly caused by high 
levels of tax rates, other forms of payments by the citizens and the existing cumbersome 
regulatory environment. Therefore, the growth of the underground economy may result in 
a decrease in tax revenues creating budget deficit problems. This is especially a significant 
issue for countries like Armenia, where, because of underdeveloped tax systems and 
difficulties associated with tax collection, the governments’ fiscal positions are not strong. 
This is particularly true when we look at the overall tax collection ratio of Armenia (see 
Table 1). As we can see it is the lowest among all CIS countries. Moreover, during the past 
four years there has been a negative trend of fall of collection of tax revenues, particularly 
income and profit taxes. 
 
Table 1: Total Government Tax Revenues in Transition Economies, Percent of GDP 
(excluding budget grants and non-tax revenues) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002 2003 
Armenia, excluding 
SIF 10.8 13.3 14.4 17.3 15.5 14.8 
 
12.5 14.4
Georgia 10.7 12.7 12.8 13.8 14.2 18.0 N/A N/A
Kyrgyz Republic 17.3 16.7 18.4 15.9 15.3 15.4 N/A N/A
Kazakhstan 11.4 12.2 16.2 16.0 20.0 19.7 N/A N/A
Azerbaijan 17.6 19.1 19.5 18.2 20.8 20.5 N/A N/A
Moldova 27.4 29.9 28.3 21.8 22.3 23.0 N/A N/A
Albania 18.3 16.6 20.3 21.3 22.4 22.5 N/A N/A
Lithuania 29.6 32.6 32.6 32.1 30.2 28.5 N/A N/A
Russia 22.5 33.0 28.6 28.8 31.3 30.9 N/A N/A
Macedonia 35.7 34.7 33.2 34.2 35.2 38.5 N/A N/A
Ukraine 36.7 38.0 36.0 33.4 35.6 32.8 N/A N/A
Estonia 37.7 39.2 36.9 35.5 35.6 38.3 N/A N/A
Latvia 37.4 39.9 43.9 40.8 37.0 38.7 N/A N/A
Slovak Republic 45.3 42.8 40.5 41.6 39.2 34.4 N/A N/A
Bulgaria 35.9 35.1 37.7 40.3 41.3 N/A N/A N/A
Croatia 48.9 47.6 50.8 47.7 45.2 38.2 N/A N/A
Source: Armenia Public Expenditure Review, World Bank, 2003.  
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Clearly, such a low level of tax to GDP ratio suggests that some parts of the 
economic activities that are recorded in the official GDP are not taxed at least fully, which 
results in the tax revenue to GDP ratio being at this low level compared to other transition 
countries. According to the government MTEF program this ratio will be increased at an 
annual rate of 0.4 percent, which would allow the government to implement the program 
of activities it has planned for the next years. This is aimed to be accomplished by more 
effective fight against corruption. 
Another negative consequence of the shadow economy is that as it grows it attracts 
more and more people and thereby increases the demand for labor. This negatively impacts 
efficiency of the labor market in the official economy and distorts the resource allocation 
in the economy. In addition, widespread shadow activities negate the overall rule of law in 
Armenia, which is essential for its sustainable development. It also demolishes the moral 
of the citizens and fair economic players and worsens the distrust in the government.  
In discussing these negative consequences of the shadow economy, we should also 
mention the positive role that it has played especially in the early stages of transition of the 
Armenian economy. Since independence in 1991 Armenia has experienced significant 
economic and social problems that were caused by various internal and external factors 
(blockade, energy shortage, war and others) that resulted in the increase of the poverty in 
the country. Many shadow activities, like mini production factories, unregistered street 
trade and other similar activities, while completely out of any official statistics, provided 
employment and income to thousands of families. In many instances, the earnings from the 
shadow economy has been the only source of income for the significant part of our society. 
Under these circumstances during the early 1990s the government “closed eyes” on many 
shadow activities and adopted relatively “mild” policies towards the latter. However, with 
economic stabilization and development negative aspects of the shadow economy 
outweighed this positive social role, and since 1998 the reduction of the size of the shadow 
economy has been a major part of Armenian government program.    
The shadow economy has also played a significant role in stimulating the economic 
activities in the country as well as in educating the new businessmen in many skills. In the 
early stages of establishment of market economy, many people in Armenia engaged in 
various forms of economic activities that were not always fully registered in the official 
bodies and represented some part of the shadow economy. In some sense the shadow 
economy has been a place where many economic entities gained the initial experience and 
entrepreneurial skills, as well as collected necessary initial capital to be able to transfer into 
official sector of the economy. The shadow economy, to some extent, has played a positive 
role and stimulated the overall economic activities in the country. It has generated 
employment and additional income, which is especially important for the poor part of the 
population. 
 
Methods of Estimating the Size of the Shadow Economy 
 
It is important to realize that because of the nature of the problem, it is almost 
impossible to measure the exact size of the economic activities taking place in the shadow 
economy in any country of the world, whether developed or less developed. Over the past 
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decades different authors and research institutions have tried to develop effective methods 
for estimating the size of the shadow economy in many countries, but there is no clear 
preference for any particular method or approach.  There is even less literature and 
research about the measurement methods of the shadow economies in transition countries 
of former Soviet Union. However, the review of the professional literature suggests that 
the methods used to estimate the magnitude of the underground economy can be 
categorized into two main groups: direct and indirect6. 
The direct approaches use volunteer surveys and samples to get information about 
the hidden economy directly from its participants. A sample of individuals and 
businessmen is chosen and respondents are asked whether they have participated in any 
underground activity or not. If the sample is representative enough and the participants are 
sincere in their answers then it is possible to estimate the extent of the shadow economy. 
As one can fairly argue the results of such surveys may not capture all the hidden activities 
in the economy because the estimation depends on the honesty of the questioned 
individuals. It is unlikely that any illegal economic activity that may also involve some 
criminal elements be reported to surveyors. This is especially true for the transition 
countries like Armenia where there is still a strong fear about the real confidentiality of any 
survey, and the survey participants are afraid to reveal the truth about their economic 
activities. The direct methods are not able to provide any information about the 
developments or trends of the underground economy over time. They only provide "point 
estimates" of the size of the shadow economy. Another disadvantage of the micro 
approach7 is that surveys are relatively expensive to conduct, and comparable surveys 
across different countries are unavailable. These and many other factors have brought a 
great deal of criticism on the direct methods as evidenced with the review of the 
professional literature. However, one significant advantage of this group of methods is that 
it reveals very useful information about the structure and composition of the labor force 
employed in the underground economy.  
In contrast to the direct methods, the indirect methods use different macroeconomic 
indicators to estimate the size of the shadow economy. Therefore, this approach is 
sometime referred in the literature as macroeconomic approach. Many economic indicators 
are affected by the development of the hidden economy. Because they are based on 
existing macroeconomic data, many countries have used these methods to assess the size 
of the hidden economy. Bellow, we will provide the brief description of the most popular 
indirect methods used in different countries of the world. 
The first method that has been used to measure the size of the underground 
economy is the discrepancy between total national expenditure and income. Because there 
are two ways to compute national income-through the measurement of aggregate 
expenditures or income- many countries find that national income calculated from reported 
total expenditure exceeds the national income calculated from reported income. The 
"initial discrepancy" between expenditure and income can be the estimate of the size of the 
 
6 Aigner, Schneider, and Ghosh (1988). 
7 Feige (1990). 
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underground economy8. A much discussed disadvantage of this method is that the 
discrepancy in national accounts may be due to measurement errors in national account 
statistics rather than the size of the underground economy. This is especially true for the 
former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe that have made a transformation 
from an old accounting system into a new one; in these countries during the early stages of 
transition there were some discrepancies in the data because of the incomplete transition to 
the new national accounting standards. 
The second macroeconomic indicator used in estimation of the size of the shadow 
economy is the discrepancy between the official and actual labor forces of the country9. 
The key assumption of this method is that any decrease in labor force activity in the regular 
economy is considered an increase in labor force participation in the underground 
economy. The difference between the official and actual labor forces’ participation 
(including the hidden economy) gives the estimate of the labor force employed in the 
underground economy. The main shortcoming of this method is that fluctuations in the size 
of the labor force can be the result of changing economic incentives, rather than the growth 
of the underground economy. 
The third transaction approach10 is based on Irving Fisher’s quantity theory of 
money, which can be presented by this equation: M*V = P*T, where, M - money supply 
(currency in circulation + demand deposits); V - velocity of money; P - prices; T - total 
transactions. The basis for this approach introduced by Feige (1979) is an assumption that 
any economic activity, whether official or underground, uses cash money for transactions. 
If the money supply and the velocity of money are known, then the value of total 
transactions (PT) can be calculated. Assuming the value of the total transactions is equal to 
the total nominal GNP, then the difference between total nominal GNP and officially 
measured GNP is the estimate of the value produced in the underground economy. Feige 
assumed that the velocity of money is equal for both the underground and official 
economies. Then he makes assumptions about the "base year", when the level of 
underground economy is very low. Thus, the ratio of the value of total transactions and 
official GNP in that particular year is minimal, and would have been unchanged over time.  
The forth group of methods widely used in different countries is called currency 
demand approach. These methods are based on estimation of the demand for currency in 
the economy. The key assumption under this two methods is that the cash is the exclusive 
payment method in the shadow economy, and therefore, by estimating the total demand for 
 
8 Park (1979) calculated size of the underground economy of the United States using this method and found a 
difference of $82 billion or four percent of measured GNP between the estimate of personal income provided 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the adjusted gross income on the basis of a sample of tax revenues 
reported by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1977. 
9 Contini and Del Boca (1978) calculated the underground economy of Italy using data on the labor force 
participation rate. 
10 Developed by Feige (1979). Feige applied the transaction approach to estimate the size of the underground 
economy of the United States. He took 1939 as a "base year", when he assumed there was no underground 
economy, because of low economic activity in the country at that time. He calculated the ratio of total 
nominal GNP and official nominal GNP equal to 10.3 in 1939, and took that figure as "normal". Applying 
this ratio in 1976 Feige estimated that the size of the underground economy of the Unites States was equal to 
22 percent of the official GNP. 
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cash over some period of time it is possible to calculate the excess amount of cash used for 
the payments of economic transactions in the shadow economy. Both methods also assume 
that the main reason for the existence of the shadow economy is high tax rates and strict 
government policy in this area. These methods have been widely used in many developed 
countries of the world. In the next part of this paper we will use these two methods to 
estimate the shadow economy of Armenia for the period of 1994-200411.  
Another interesting method for estimation of the size of the shadow economy is 
called Total Electricity Approach12. The difference between the changes in total electricity 
consumption and official GDP is the basis for the estimation in this method. It was used for 
estimating the size of the underground sectors of some transition economies. The elasticity 
of "short run electricity-to-GDP ratio" (official and underground) is said to be close to 113. 
Any difference between total GDP and official measured GDP is the estimate of the size of 
the underground economy. This method was used for estimating the size of the shadow 
economies in 24 transition economies for the period of 1990-1994. Later in 2002 this 
method was modified14 and new estimates of shadow economy for the period of 1995-
1997 were presented for these transition economies. 
 
Table 2: Shadow economy’s size using electricity consumption method, as a 
percentage of official GDP, 1990-1997 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995* 1996* 1997* 
Armenia  31 50 143 108 80 74 93 65
Azerbaijan 28 22 16 52 79 103 101 99
Belarus  18 21 20 18 23 28 20 15
Bulgaria  34 34 34 34 32 44 70 - 
Croatia  30 39 28 36 34 31 27 44
Czech Republic 7 18 18 23 24 24 25 23
Estonia  25 34 33 45 66 75 78 71
Georgia  33 45 112 153 116 126 105 87
Hungary  37 43 36 38 34 38 41 37
Kazakhstan  20 35 32 41 30 46 33 27
Kyrgyz Rep. 20 30 53 91 142 261 199 180
Latvia  15 21 49 40 35 38 39 - 
Lithuania  13 19 23 36 43 38 11  
Macedonia 30 44 48 75 89 108 128 135
Moldova  22 45 88 41 130 127 140 - 
Poland 24 30 23 21 17 15 13 - 
Romania  29 21 24 19 11 12 15 24
Russia  17 18 30 35 45 53 54 52
Slovakia  6 15 14 19 16 11 18 - 
Slovenia 30 35 33 30 33 35 34 - 
                                                 
11 In the following part of the paper we will refer to these two currency demand methods as Tanzi and 
Gutman methods named after the researchers who first introduced them. 
12 Kaufam and Kaliberda (1996). 
13 Johnson, Kaufman, Shleifer, 1997, p.174. 
14 Eilat and Zinnes (2002). 
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Tajikistan 20 20 61 70 105 111 137 91
Turkmenistan  20 25 -7 -3 2 22 25 - 
Ukraine  19 23 34 46 71 96 115 128
Uzbekistan 13 10 5 0 12 6 15 11
Source: Eilat and Zinnes (2002). 
*-Estimates of Modified Electricity Consumption method. 
 
This method which is based on the data on electricity consumption is quite 
questionable, since the source data on electricity consumption in these sample countries, 
especially in early 1990s is not reliable. For example, in Armenia, because of energy crisis 
the real level of electricity production and consumption have been a controversial issue 
subject to public debates even until now. Therefore, one should be very cautious in 
interpreting and using estimates that are based on doubtful figures. 
 
Measurement of the Shadow Economy of Armenia for the period of 1994-2004 
 
The only official statistics about the size of the shadow economy of Armenia was 
published in 1999. The National Statistical Service(NSS) of Armenia conducted a survey 
of 9,000 individuals which provided some information about the size and structure of the 
shadow economy in Armenia. According to the findings of that survey the informal sector 
of the Armenian economy is estimated to be of 28.9% from official nominal GDP. The 
following are the main findings of the results of the survey: 
 
Table 3: Official Estimated Level of Underground  
Economy of Armenia by Sectors, 1999. 
 Percentage 
Industry 28.7 
Construction 46.1 
Transport and communication 21.1 
Trade 75.5 
Agriculture 21.0 
Other Branches 27.1 
GDP at market prices 28.9 
  Source: National Statistical Service, 1999. 
 
While the NSS has not conducted similar follow up surveys during the next years, 
however, it estimated an increase in the underground economy and for 2002 it already used 
30% estimate in adjusting the official GDP. As we discussed in the previous chapters, 
while such direct methods of estimation provide useful information about the structure of 
the informal economy, however, they are somewhat subjective and biased since rely on 
how much were the individuals sincere. Also, as it was the case in Armenia, the surveys 
are not easy to conduct every year.  
The international experience suggests that indirect methods, which are based on 
some macroeconomic indicators can yield better and reliable estimates of the shadow 
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sector. However, as we saw one of the major difficulties for estimating the size of the 
shadow economy in transition countries, including in Armenia, is the absence of reliable 
and long-term data on both the micro and macro levels. It is worth mentioning that for 
Armenia and many other countries of the former Soviet Union, the national currencies 
were introduced and independent economic policies were implemented only in early 1990. 
This limits the ability to use various methods described above as well as run regression 
models that will be based on yearly data. 
Despite the fact that we have only up to ten yearly observations in our sample 
period of 1994-2004, which limits our ability to run regression model based on yearly data, 
we still believe that the currency demand approaches are possible to apply in Armenia by 
using the available monthly and quarterly data. The original models of Gutman and 
Tanzi15  were modified to better fit a less developed, transition economy setting. As 
discussed above the currency demand approach assumes that the shadow economy uses 
only cash money for making payments. This key assumption is well defended in our case, 
since during our sample period of 1994-2004, the major parts of transactions in the shadow 
economy have been made in cash.  
 
Estimating the Size of the Shadow Economy Using Tanzi’s Method 
 
The following key assumptions were made in applying new currency demand 
method for estimating the size of the underground sector of the Armenian economy for the 
period of 1998-200416. First, strict and tough tax administration and regulations were the 
main reason for the existence of the shadow economy. Second, only cash money is used to 
make payments in the informal economy. This assumption gives us sound reason to 
believe that any increase in the underground economy would raise the demand for cash in 
the economy. Therefore, by estimating the currency demand, it is possible to calculate the 
"excess" demand for currency that comes from the underground part of the economy. 
Under this methods, it is also assumed that the income velocity of money is the same in the 
official and underground parts of the economy.  
The procedure for estimating the size of the shadow economy involves the 
following steps. First, the currency demand equation for Armenia is specified. Second, the 
coefficients on the explanatory variables are estimated. Third, the equation is estimated 
assuming the coefficient on the tax variable is equal to zero, while keeping the coefficients 
of the other variables unchanged. Fourth, the "excess" currency is calculated by subtracting 
the estimated currency with zero taxes from the initially estimated currency. This “excess” 
currency demand is attributed to the shadow economy. Fifth, the size of the underground 
economy is calculated by multiplying the "excess" currency by the income velocity of 
money, defined as the ratio of GDP to Currency in Circulation.  
 
15 Tanzi (1980 and 1983) modified Cagan’s (1958) original model of the demand for currency and developed 
his currency demand approach. In contrast to Cagan (1958), who took currency as the dependent variable for 
his equation of the demand for currency, Tanzi (1980 and 1983) took the ratio of currency to money, defined 
as M2, as the dependent variable, and developed his method for estimating the size of the underground 
economy 
16 Because of unavailability of reliable quarterly data on tax revenues for earlier periods the analysis under 
this method starts from year 1998. 
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We anticipate that the demand for currency in circulation in Armenia can be 
estimated using the following independent variables:  
 
Currency Demand =f(Tax/GDP; GDP; CPI; R; Ex) 
                   +            +         +     -    +     
 
where, 
Tax/GDP = the ratio of nominal total tax revenues to nominal GDP; 
GDP = official gross domestic product; 
CPI= consumer price index; 
R = the annual average interest rate on deposits; 
Ex = Armenian dram per US dollar exchange rat. 
 
In contrary to the model used by Tanzi, we followed the original model of currency 
demand introduced by Cagan  in 1958 and use currency in circulation as a dependent 
variable of our model, instead of the ratio of currency in circulation to M2. Also, as a key 
explanatory variable for taxes we use the ratio of nominal total tax revenues to nominal 
GDP in contrary to the Tanzi’s original model where marginal tax rates were used for 
capturing the tax burden and the effects of tight tax administration on the demand for 
currency. The main reason for such a change is the unavailability of quarterly data on 
marginal tax rates in Armenia due to the peculiarities of the tax system and the difficult 
process of tax administration during this transition period (existence of lump-sum tax 
payments, simplified taxes, unhealthy practice of advance tax payments and other factors). 
Because of the limited number of observations quarterly data is used and the selection of 
this ratio is best suited for this analysis. The selection of tax to GDP ratio is assumed in 
this equation to reflect the overall tax and customs burden on the businesses; higher ratio 
assumes that there was increased pressure on the businesses which would increase their 
incentives to go underground while increasing the demand for total currency in circulation.  
Based on the key assumptions of the model, we expect the coefficient on the (Tax/GDP) 
ratio to have a positive sign.  
The other determinant for the currency demand in Armenia is the interest rates. We 
expect the coefficient on the interest rate on demand deposits (R) to have a negative sign. 
A higher deposit rate stimulates people to put their cash money in deposit accounts, and 
thus decreases the demand for currency. 
We expect that the economic development of the country has a significant influence 
on the determination of currency demand. As the economy grows more and more 
transactions are taking place in the economy. Taking into account that most of the 
economic transactions, both in the official and unofficial sectors, are paid by cash, then it is 
assumed that the demand for currency increases with the growth of the economy. As a 
measure of economic development the real GDP is used. We expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient on the GDP variable.  
Dollarization of the economy is a significant problem for Armenia. Although 
illegal, the major economic transactions in the economy (purchases of houses and cars for 
example) are still being undertaken in US dollars. Also, the US dollar is considered as the 
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main medium for storing wealth. Therefore, we included the exchange rate of the 
Armenian dram per US dollar in the model as we anticipate it has a huge effect on the 
demand for Armenian drams in the economy. Despite the recent trends in the foreign 
exchange market in Armenia towards the strengthening of the national currency, however, 
during the whole period under consideration the Armenian dram has been depreciating. 
Because of the high level of dollarization of the Armenian economy and the fact that for 
some large part of our society the remittances from abroad, any change in the exchange 
rate is likely to have an impact on the demand for currency. The exchanged US dollars 
would be traded for more Armenian dram, thus increasing the demand for drams. 
We also think that the inflation should determine the demand for currency. The 
increase in the prices would push for demand for more cash in the circulation. However, 
the regression results showed that the inflation (CPI) was very insignificant and thus we 
removed it from the final equation. The estimation of the equation for currency demand 
yielded the following results: 
  
C = - 92880.3 + 217461.2 (Tax/GDP) + 0.127 (GDP) - 789.721 (R) + 163.045(Ex) 
       t stat    (-2.89)                    (4.47)                     (7.24)             (-3.82)         (3.36)  
 
  R2 = 0.95   Adjusted R2=0.94 
 
The estimation results show that all of the explanatory variables were statistically 
significant at the five percent level of significance. Therefore, the equation with these 
variables is chosen for our estimation calculations. All variables in equation  are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level and all coefficients except (GDP) and (Ex) 
have the expected signs.  
 
Calculating the Size of the Shadow Economy 
 
From this regression results we can estimate the currency in circulation(C^) for 
each quarter of our sample period of 1998-2004. Based on our key assumption that the 
underground economy results from strict and tough tax administration and regulations, we 
set the coefficient on the (Tax/GDP) variable equal to zero, while other coefficients are 
unchanged. We then estimate the amount of the currency that would have been demanded 
if there were no taxes. From this procedure we obtain the value of currency in circulation if 
there were no taxes(C^^). We calculate the size of the currency used in the shadow 
economy by subtracting the estimated currency with zero taxes (C^^) from (C^). We use 
the velocity of money, defined as the ratio of official GDP to Currency, and  multiply it 
with the illegal money in the circulation to get the size of the underground economy. Here, 
however, we should accept that the velocity of money should have been even higher if the 
official GDP included the full size of the shadow economy. Table 3 summarizes our results 
and provides annual estimates of the size of the underground economy in Armenia for the 
period of 1998-2004.  
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Table: 4 Illegal currency and Underground Economy calculated using Tanzi’s 
new currency demand approach. 
Underground Economy of Armenia 
 
Illegal 
currency 
(mln AMD) 
Velocity 
(GDP/Currency) Quarterly 
Annual 
(mln AMD) 
Percent of 
official GDP 
Q1-98       46,281.5           3.4         157,083.0    
Q2-98       32,925.6           5.9         193,993.6    
Q3-98       23,118.3           8.0         185,656.6    
Q4-98       21,992.8           8.5         186,747.0       723,480.1  76.0% 
Q1-99       46,206.8           3.9         178,867.8    
Q2-99       32,097.4           6.7         214,155.1    
Q3-99       28,513.7           8.3         236,518.0    
Q4-99       32,177.5           7.5         240,030.6       869,571.5  87.7% 
Q1-00       42,456.2           3.6         152,002.1    
Q2-00       33,270.7           5.5         184,614.0    
Q3-00       25,991.5           7.4         192,553.1    
Q4-00       27,828.7           6.0         166,696.4       695,865.6  67.4% 
Q1-01       48,043.2           3.2         155,244.8    
Q2-01       36,893.8           4.5         165,890.1    
Q3-01       19,640.3           7.1         139,903.2    
Q4-01       25,096.1           6.2         155,885.7       616,923.8  52.4% 
Q1-02       49,574.1           2.8         137,542.4    
Q2-02       36,756.6           4.6         167,819.6    
Q3-02       23,908.7           6.7         159,330.2    
Q4-02       24,291.1           5.4         131,323.2       596,015.4  43.9% 
Q1-03       48,958.1           2.5         124,280.1    
Q2-03       33,283.8           4.3         142,880.0    
Q3-03       22,358.7           6.6         147,346.4    
Q4-03       24,703.2           6.1         151,816.3       566,322.8  39.0% 
Q1-04       50,712.4           2.7         137,387.9    
Q2-04       33,432.1           4.7         156,583.9    
Q3-04       22,615.8           7.4         168,284.4       616,341.5*  42.5% 
Source: Monetary data is from the Central Bank of Armenia.  
*/Note: The figures for nominal GDP for the forth quarter of 2004 were estimated based on the available data 
of October, November 2004. 
 
The findings of this model suggest that the shadow economy of Armenia was at its 
highest level in 1999 (87.7% of the official GDP or in absolute terms about 869,571 
million drams). The lowest level of shadow activities is recorded in 2003, when the size of 
the hidden sector was about 39% of the official GDP. These estimates reflect those  
shadow activities that, according to the assumptions made under this methods, are due to 
the tight tax administration and regulations. However, it is also important to realize that the 
taxes are not the only major cause of shadow activities, and thus the real magnitude of the 
underground economy in Armenia should be higher than these presented estimates. In any 
case, these findings are very important in understanding the impact of tougher and 
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inefficient tax administration, as reflected in higher collected tax revenues, on the 
businesses and their incentives to underreport activities. Also, these are only these 
estimates capture only those parts of the hidden economic activities that used drams as 
their method of payments. The shadow activities that were paid in the US or other foreign 
currency are not reflected in these estimates. 
 
Estimating the Size of the Underground Economy Using Gutman’s Method 
 
Now we will try to estimate the size of the shadow economy of Armenia using the 
other currency demand approach first introduced by Gutman in 1977. This currency 
demand approach has been applied in many countries of the world and is based around 
some key assumptions made about the ratio of currency in circulation to demand deposits 
(C/D). First, as in the previous method this approach too assumes that the economic 
transactions in the shadow part of the economy use cash as the medium of payment. It is 
assumed that in any country there is a period when the underground economy is at its 
minimal level17. It is also believed that during the period with no or minimal underground 
economy the C/D ratio also takes its lowest magnitude. But the most critical assumption of 
this method is that the C/D ratio is constant over time and any change in that ratio is 
caused by the increase in the size of underground economy.  
While realizing that the last assumption is somewhat weak, especially in a 
developing country setting, where the C/D ratio can be changed not only because of the 
shadow economy, but other factors, like economic growth, trust in banking sector, 
however, we think that an alternative estimates of the shadow economy would give us a 
better understanding about its size and trends for a longer period (1994-2004). We will also 
be able to compare the results with the estimates from Tanzi’s method. 
We have made several key assumptions under this method. First, it is assumed that 
during the period under consideration all transactions in the shadow economy of Armenia 
have been cash transactions.  Second, the underground economy is the net result of high 
tax rates and restrictions imposed by government and that C/D ratio is influenced by the 
government rules and restrictions in the revenue mobilization area. Third, the average of 
the C/D ratio for the January-March, 1994 period is taken as "normal" assuming there was 
minimal underground economy in this "base period". We assume there was no 
underground economy or at least its size was negligible in the early phase of introduction 
of the national currency. Before the introduction of the Armenian dram in November 1993, 
the Russian ruble was the official currency in circulation. When the national currency was 
introduced, the Central Bank of Armenia started to convert the Russian rubles into newly 
introduced drams under some fixed and strict procedures. This process took several months 
and was overall strictly controlled, which means that the money from the underground 
economy was not easy, at least in the early stages of this currency change, to transfer all 
the funds from rubles to drams. It would have taken longer periods, at least several months 
to allow all cash money used in the underground sector to be transformed into drams. 
Therefore, we assume that the C/D ratio at the beginning of 1994 reflected an economy 
with minimal level of underground activities. During January-March, 1994 the average of 
 
17  For the US, Gutman assumed that such a period was 1939-41. 
the C/D ratio was equal to 1.15, which is taken as the base (“normal”) number for our 
calculations. 
 
Figure 1: Currency to Demand Deposits ratio (January, 1994-November 2004) 
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Source: Data from the Central Bank of Armenia. 
 
As we can see from this figure the C/D ratio has had very interesting fluctuations 
over the period under consideration. It reached its highest level (6.7) in December, 1996. 
The other interesting pattern of the C/D ratio is that it had its highest levels in December of 
every year. This speaks about the high demand for cash in the economy at the end of 
calendar year, which is overall in line with the economic processes. 
For estimating the size of the shadow economy we first calculate the C/D ratio for 
each month of the period of January, 1994-November, 2004. Then we subtract the 
"normal" value of the C/D ratio (1.15) from the actual value of the ratio for each month 
and get the "excess" C/D ratio, which, under this method, was due to the underground 
economy. Third, we multiply the actual demand deposits of every month by the "excess" 
amount of the C/D ratio and get the amount of illegal currency used in the underground 
sector for each month. Fourth, we define the income velocity of money, defined as ratio 
GDP to M1. By multiplying the illegal money by the income velocity of money, we get 
estimates of the underground economy. Figure 2 summarizes the findings using Gutman’s 
method for Armenia for the period of  1994-2004. 
 
Figure 2: The Size of the Shadow Economy of Armenia using Gutman’s Approach 
(1994-2004, percent of official nominal GDP of each year) 
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Comparison of Findings of Two Alternative Methods 
 
Figure 3 summarizes our findings from these two alternative methods which 
provide information about the size of the shadow economy in Armenia during the period of 
1994-2004. It also includes the estimates for 1990-1997 received by electricity 
consumption method done by Eilat and Zinnes for 24 transition countries, as described in 
above. The findings of this method are overall in line with those estimates received using 
Tanzi’s method. As we mentioned the Tanzi’s method capture only those shadow activities 
that are the solely result of taxes. Gutman’s approach estimates the size of the shadow 
economy based on the excess demand for cash and the estimates under this method is 
assumed that include all shadow activities, including those that were result of tax evasion. 
Except the year of 2000, when there was a political instability in the country as a result of 
October 27, 1999 events, the estimates of Gutman’s approach are higher than those 
received under Tanzi’s method.   
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Figure 3: Estimates of the Size of Shadow Economy of Armenia from three different 
methods (percent of official GDP, 1994-2004) 
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Source: The Electricity method estimates are taken from Eilat and Zinnes, 2002. These estimates were 
available only for the period of 1990-1997. 
 
 
Based on the estimates of the shadow economy we can calculate the losses that the 
government has had in the form of lost tax revenues. Using the ratio of tax revenues to 
GDP we can calculate the tax losses for each year of our sample. We should note that the 
use of the official statistics on tax revenues and nominal GDP is not the best way of 
calculating the amount that was lost because of the hidden activities. However, since we do 
not have detailed information about the composition of the shadow sector and the relevant 
tax rates for each segment, the use of the total Tax to GDP ratio is applied for getting some 
general estimates of lost tax revenues. 
 
Table: 5: Estimates of Tax Revenue Losses as  
Direct Consequence of Shadow Economy, (million drams) 
 
Shadow 
Economy 
/Gutman/  
Shadow 
Economy 
/Tanzi/ 
Tax/GDP 
 ratio 
GDP 
nominal 
Tax losses 
/Gutman/ 
Tax losses 
/Tanzi/ 
1994               37,773   0.115       187,080            4,344   
1995 194,585  0.107       522,285          20,821   
1996             371,385   0.108       660,309          40,110   
1997             485,384   0.133       798,555          64,556   
1998             455,062  723,480 0.144       951,900          65,529        104,181  
1999             466,872  869,571 0.173       991,550          80,769        150,436  
2000             554,950  695,865 0.155    1,032,630          86,017        107,859  
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2001             683,253  616,923 0.149    1,177,235  
   
101,805         91,922  
2002             786,078  596,015 0.125    1,356,983          98,260         74,502  
2003             725,803  566,322 0.144    1,618,577        104,516         81,550  
2004             775,385  616,341 0.140*    1,859,619*        108,554         86,288  
Source: Author’s estimates.  
*/ Tax/GDP ratio for 2004 is an estimate. GDP figure for 2004 is an estimate. 
 
As we can see from these calculations significant amount of tax revenues are lost because 
of the fact that many economic activities are not captured by official bodies. Depending on 
the actual size of the shadow economy the losses only in tax revenues, for example, in year 
2003 is estimated to be around 105 billion drams, based on the estimates of the Gutman 
method and 82 billion drams, if estimates of Tanzi method are used. It should be noted, 
that these are the losses occurred only in the area of tax collection; the actual negative 
consequences of the shadow economy can be higher if other areas (likes social payments, 
dollar denominated activities, and others) are also taken into account. 
 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 It is important to realize that the shadow economy is present in almost every 
country of the world and it is very hard to measure its actual size. Besides its negative 
consequences (less collected revenues, deteriorated macroeconomic indicators, and others), 
the shadow economy in Armenia has played a significant stabilizing role during the early 
years of independence as it provided a source of income for the population. It also 
stimulated economic activities and provided necessary entrepreneurial skills for the start-
up businesses.  
The findings of both monetary methods (Tanzi and Gutman) applied in Armenia 
confirm the existence of huge shadow sector in the Armenian economy for every year 
since 1994. While realizing shortcomings of both of the methods applied (the use of 
Tax/GDP ratio, the assumption of constant C/D ratio, quarterly data and not high number 
of regression observations in the sample, and others) and the fact that these estimates are 
not precisely capturing all hidden economic activities in Armenia, however, these 
estimates of the shadow economy of Armenia provide useful information about the 
development of underground economy over the past decade, which can be used for making 
relevant adjustments and changes in the economic and social policies. The huge 
underground sector for a country that has very high level of poverty means that the 
government does not fully and effectively carrying out its important functions of essential 
public services’ delivery and creation of fair rules for economic completion.  
Based on the estimates of the shadow economy it is also possible to calculate the 
amount of revenue losses that Armenia has been encountering over the past years. Using 
the ratio of tax revenues to official GDP we can estimate the tax amount that was lost 
because of the existence of the shadow economy. For 2003 it can be estimated that in total 
of about 82-105 billion drams of additional tax revenues were lost because of the existence 
of the shadow economy.  
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One of the main directions for the government’s fight against shadow economy 
should be the anti-corruption activities. The shadow economy and anticorruption are 
interrelated; on one hand the existence of the shadow economy promotes the corruption in 
tax authorities, on the other hand because of corruption, there is an increase in shadow 
activities. So, the government and the society should combine their efforts in carrying out 
effective anti-corruption program, that would also result in the decrease of the size of the 
shadow economy. Further modernization of tax and customs administrations, by 
strengthening and improving the professional tax and customs services and developing 
ethical standards of tax and customs officers with some strict mechanisms of control, can 
have significant impact on the size of the shadow economy. 
We would suggest that the major reason for existence of the shadow sector in the 
economy in Armenia is the relatively easy and not risky possibility of tax avoidance. 
Today it is too easy to hide and too easy to avoid any punishment, and many economic 
entities prefer to get as much benefit from working underground, as possible, since they 
know that if caught there are easy and quick ways of solving their problems. Therefore, the 
system of penalties and punishments applied in these cases need to be reassessed, along 
with improvement of explanatory work with the business entities. On December 28, 2004 
the President of the Republic has highlighted the problem of underreporting during his 
regular end-of-year meeting with the country’s businessmen and announced that the 
government will tighten the control over underreported economic activities during 2005 
and there will be no exceptions. If such a tight and wide policy adopted by the authorities 
in the next year, certainly there will be some significant improvement in the reduction of 
the shadow sector of Armenia. 
Unfair and unequal tax administration is another major reason for the existence of 
shadow economy. Many business entities are hiding their activities in order of being able 
to compete with those who enjoy the protection of various tax and state officials. The 
unfair tax administration, unequal treatment and discretionary use of tax code are also 
highlighted in the recent FIAS report18, as the main problems for the investors. Therefore, 
as recommended in the report the government should develop right and fair mechanisms 
for incentives in tax administration, provide better information sharing among various state 
bodies. 
One of the effective ways of fighting the underground economic activities can be 
the promotion of non-cash methods of payment in the economy. Since almost all economic 
activities are using cash as a mean of payment, stimulation of non-cash payment methods 
would of course significantly improve the situation. The ArCa (Armenian Card) network, 
supported by the Central Bank is already on place, however it still has a long way to go to 
become a popular and  convenient method for making various payments. The government, 
in cooperation with commercial banks and the Central Bank, should play more active role 
and should introduce effective mechanisms for promotion of the non-cash payment 
methods, including ArCA cards. 
More improved information and effective information sharing mechanisms 
between various state institutions, such as the tax, customs, state pension fund, statistics 
 
18 Armenia-Assessment of Administrative procedures for doing business in Armenia. FIAS, The World Bank, 
2004. 
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service, control agencies, would allow to better monitor and capture all economic 
transactions carried out in various sectors of the economy. The recent decision of the 
Armenian government to transfer the administration authority for collection of state 
pension fund payments to State Tax Service is aimed towards the above objective. 
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